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Abstract 
 
The present paper studies the effect of the choice of product quality on trade and location of firms. We 
discuss a model where consumers have preferences for the quality of a set of differentiated varieties. 
Firms do not only develop and sell manufacturing varieties in a monopolistic competitive market but also 
determine the quality level of their varieties by investing in research and development. We explore the 
price and quality equilibrium properties when firms are immobile. We then consider a footloose capital 
model where capital is allocated to the manufacturing firms in the region offering the highest return. We 
show that the larger region produces varieties of higher quality and that the quality gap increases with 
larger asymmetries in region sizes and with larger trade costs. Finally, the home market effect is mitigated 
when firms choose their product quality. 
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1 Introduction
The present paper studies the e¤ect of the choice of product quality on trade and location
of rms. In particular, this paper discusses the role of the size of regions on rms
choice of location and product quality. It is well-know that rmsmobility fosters spatial
polarization of economic activity (Krugman 1991). It is however less clear how di¤erences
in region sizes a¤ect the quality produced in each region. Recently, Picard and Okubo
(2012) highlight that rms endowed with higher qualities choose to locate in the larger
region. Yet, product quality is not an exogenous factor. Firms invest in research and
development to improve their product quality and this investment is likely a¤ect their
decisions about plant locations. Such a relationship between quality and location is a
topic that has lacked attention. The present paper therefore focuses on the incentives to
invest in product quality and the impact of such investments on rmslocation.
In this paper we build a quality-augmented version of Ottaviano et al. s (2002) model
where consumers have preferences for the quality of manufacturing varieties. As in Foster
et al. (2008), the linear properties of the demand system of this model are particularly
well suited for such an analysis. As is usual in the literature, each rm produces a distinct
variety, competes under monopolistic competition and chooses its location in one of two
regions. We consider a footloose capital model where capital is allocated to the rms and
region o¤ering the highest returns. The main di¤erence with the literature is that rms
are also able to determine their quality levels by investing in research and development.
We obtain the following results. We rstly consider the rmschoice of quality at a
given spatial distribution of rms. We show that the larger region attracts the rms that
produce varieties of higher quality and that the quality gap between regions increases with
larger regional asymmetries and larger trade costs. Hence, the size of the local market
is an important determinant of the average product quality and the added value of the
goods that are produced in a particular region. In this paper, such a result does not
hinge on income e¤ects but rather on a market size and competition e¤ect. On the one
hand, rms get higher returns from their investment when they locate in the region where
demand is larger. On the other hand, investments in product quality foster competition
and make the larger region more competitive. Hence, incentives to invest in quality are
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mitigated by a harsher competition in larger regions. Quite interestingly, we show that
the co-agglomeration of rms and consumers in the same locale is good for average quality
and bad for aggregate price index (good for cost of living). Although rms agglomerating
in the larger region face a harsher competition, they benet from a larger market which
increases their incentives to invest in quality. Therefore, global quality rises. Finally, the
model highlights the existence of complementarity e¤ects between trade costs and returns
to investments in quality improvements. Quality investments reinforce the impact of trade
costs on prices and consumptions.
We secondly consider the location choice of rms that simultaneously choose their
product quality. We assume an investment technology with decreasing returns. We show
that the location equilibrium exists and is unique. In this location and quality equilibrium,
the rms that choose to produce high quality varieties locate in the larger region. As
standard in the economic geography literature, a fall in trade cost entices a larger number
of rms to locate in the larger region. More interestingly, we show that rms invest
more in quality on average and the quality gap decreases as trade costs fall. Removing
trade barriers is always good for quality because rms have access to larger markets and
more easily recoup their investment costs. This market access e¤ect always dominates
the negative e¤ect that quality investments have on competition and protability. We
also show that market integration reduces regional disparities in terms of product quality.
Better access to consumers increases the economic returns on quality investment. Finally
we provide ambiguous results about the e¤ect of investments in product quality on the
spatial distribution of rms and the home market e¤ect.
Related literature This paper is closely related to several literature strands. First,
quality and location is the focus of a well-known business literature about "sophistication"
and "clustering". Porter (1990, p. 188) reports some qualitative evidence that investment
in product quality turns out to be more important and more successful in regions with
larger demand sizes. A typical example lies in the story of the two German designers of
the rotary press, Koenig and Bauer, who returned from London (U.K.) to Bavaria (Ger-
many) in 1818 to set up their rst plant because this region was one amongst the worlds
largest market for printing press. German competitors in the press industry responded
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with di¤erentiation strategies based on quality and reliability, which made Germany the
country with the highest quality and highest price premium in this market. Similarly, the
emergence of a US cluster in patient monitoring equipment after World War II is mainly
explained by the fact that the US wealthy private hospitals had higher demands for so-
phisticated monitoring than any European country with socialized medicine. Finally,
the emergence of the Japanese cluster in the robotic industry is also explained by the
higher demand for robotics by the Japanese management who had signicantly stronger
engineering background.
Second, since the recent availability of trade microdata, a recent strand of empirical
trade literature is developping around the question of product quality and trade. It is
shown that the quality or the value of goods plays an important role in international
trade pattern. For instance, using US commodity trade data, Schott (2004) nds that the
unit value of trade within one product line is higher for high-wage countries. Hummels
and Klenow (2005) nd that richer countries export higher value goods. Hallak (2006)
nds that rich countries import relatively more from the countries producing high qual-
ity goods.1 Hence, there also exists quantitative evidence of heterogeneity of product
quality in the trade patterns. For many authors, trade is better explained by demand
or quality heterogeneity than by cost heterogeneity (see Baldwin 2005, Greenaway 1995
and Greenaway et al. 1995; Fukao et al. 2003; Foster et al. 2008). Khandelwal (2010),
Baldwin and Harrigan (2011), Manova and Zhang (2012) provide additional support of
heterogeneous quality in international trade data. This suggests that the study of the
relationship between quality, trade and rmslocation deserves a dedicated attention.
Finally, academic research has produced a theoretical literature about product quality
and trade based on vertical di¤erentiation to explain why higher quality products are
more likely to be consumed and produced in high wage countries.2 Murphy and Shleifer
(1997) develop a model where high quality products end up being produced in high
human capital countries. Feenstra and Romalis (2006) extend the Heckscher Ohlin model
1Hummels and Klenow (2005) use import data from 76 countries at the six digit level of the Harmonized
System and then nd that the quality margin is a function of the exporter size. Hallak (2006) analyzes
bilateral trade ows among 60 countries.
2See Linden (1961), Falvey (1981), Falvey and Kierzkowski (1987) and Flam and Helpman (1987) and
Stockey (1991).
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to product qualities. Recently, Kluger and Verhoogen (2012) theoretically study the
issue of endogenous quality in a trade context but focus on the impact of exchange rate
devaluations. Eckel et al. (2011) discuss the impact of quality choice of multi-product
monopolies and oligopolies serving consumers with linear demands that are similar to
ours. However, none of those models study the location of rms and the impact of the
co-agglomeration of rms with workers. The relationship between product quality and
location choice is recently studied in Picard and Okubo (2012) who show that larger
regions attracts better quality rms.3 This paper extends this idea in a model where
product quality is a variable chosen by rms.
The paper is structured as it follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 and 4
discuss the choice of quality and location. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
Our model extends the footloose capital model of Ottaviano and Thisse (2004) by allow-
ing for consumers preference for product quality. In this section, we present the basic
model and characterize the market outcome for any given organizational structure and
spatial distribution of rms. In this paper the timing is as follows: rst rms simultane-
ously choose their quality and location, second they set their prices and nally consumers
consume the goods produced by the rms. We solve this sequential game by backward
induction.
2.1 Preferences
Consider a world with two regions, labeled H and F . Variables associated with each
region will be subscripted accordingly. We assume that there is a mass L of consumers,
with a share 1=2  H < 1 located in region H. In what follows, we refer to H as the
large and to F as the small region.
All consumers in region i = H;F have identical quasi-linear preferences over a homoge-
nous good and a continuum of horizontally di¤erentiated varieties, indexed by v 2 V. As
3Okubo et al. (2010) study a similar two-type heterogeneity model.
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in Ottaviano et al. (2002) and Ottaviano and Thisse (2004), the utility of a representative
agent in region i is given by the following quadratic function:
Ui =
Z
V
b(v)qi(v)dv      
2
Z
V
[qi(v)]
2dv   
2
Z
V
qi(v)dv
2
+ qoi ; (1)
where qi(v) denotes the consumption of variety v in region i and qoi stands for the con-
sumption of the homogenous good in that same region. The parameter  is a measure of
the degree of substitution between varieties whereas     (> 0) measures the consumer
bias toward a more dispersed consumption of varieties.
The new element in this model is the function b(v) : V  [0; 1]! [;1);    > 0,
that reects the quality of variety v. It measures the consumers willingness to pay for
product variety v; that is, the intensity of consumers preferences for the di¤erentiated
product v with respect to the homogenous good. When b(v) is identical for all varieties,
varieties are horizontally and symmetrically di¤erentiated. When b(v) varies, the quality
and therefore the willingness to pay varies across varieties so that goods are also vertically
di¤erentiated in the sense that consumers have a higher willingness to pay for the variety
v than for v0 if b(v) > b(v0). Note nally that the consumers have identical preferences:
there is no a priori regional preferences. We denote the average quality by   RV b(v)dv.
Each consumer in region i = H;F maximizes his/her utility (1) subject to his/her
budget constraint: Z
V
pi(v)qi(v)dv + poi q
o
i  wi + poi qo; (2)
where pi(v) denotes the consumer price of variety v and wi stands for each individuals
earning. Following Ottaviano et al. (2002), we assume that consumers own a su¢ ciently
large endowment qo > 0 of the numéraire. Consequently, income e¤ects are present in the
demand for homogenous goods but are absent in the demand for manufacturing varieties.
As will become clear in the sequel, free trade in the homogenous good market leads to
price equalization across regions and makes this good a natural choice for the numéraire
(poi = 1; i = H;F ).
We assume that all varieties are consumed. Maximizing the utility (1) subject to the
budget constraint (2) yields the following rst order condition:
b(v)  (   ) qi(v)   Z
V
qi()d   pi(v) = 0 (3)
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Integrating the left hand side of this equality yields the average quality
 = 
Z
V
qi(v)dv +
Z
V
pi(v)dv (4)
The last two expressions allows us to derive the individual demand for variety v as the
following linear formula:
qi(v) = (b+ c) [b(v)  pi(v)] + c (Pi   ) (5)
where
Pi =
Z
V
pi(v)dv
is the manufacturing price index in region i and where b and c are the following positive
coe¢ cients
b =
1

and c =

 (   ) (6)
The parameter b measures the price sensitivity of demand and the parameter c the degree
of product substitutability. In particular, when c! 0 varieties are perfectly di¤erentiated,
whereas they become perfect substitutes when c!1.
2.2 Price equilibrium and trade costs
Production takes place in two sectors. In the rst sector, the homogenous good is pro-
duced under perfect competition using one unit of labor per unit of output. We assume
that this good can be costlessly traded between regions, which implies that its price is in-
ternationally equalized and equal to wages. Normalizing wages to one we get poi = wi = 1
for i = H;F , which justies our previous choice of this good as the numéraire.
In the second sector, called the manufacturing sector, each rm produces under in-
creasing returns to scale and sells a single di¤erentiated manufacturing variety. Let Vi
and ni be the set and the mass of manufacturing rms located in region i. That is,
ni = (Vi) 
R 1
0
di(v) where (Vi) is the measure of Vi and i(v) is the measure of
variety v if it is produced in region i (H(v) + F (v) = 1 and H(v)  F (v) = 0). In this
section we derive the price equilibrium for a given location structure (VH ;VF ) and for a
given distribution of product quality b() across rms. The average quality are therefore
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given by
 =
Z 1
0
b(v)dH(v) + Z 1
0
b(v)dF (v)
The demand for each variety in each market depends on the set of varieties produced
domestically and on the set produced abroad. In accord with empirical evidence (e.g.,
Head and Mayer, 2000; Haskel and Wolf, 2001), we assume that product markets are
segmented. Firms are hence free to set prices specic to each national market they sell
their product in. The prot of a manufacturing rm established in region i is given by
i(v) = Lipii(v)qii(v) + Lj(pij(v)  )qij(v)  I (b (v))  ri(v); v 2 Vi (7)
where L is the total population, i is the share of population in region i, I (b (v)) is
the rms investment in quality b(v), ri(v) is the remuneration of rm vs capital and
qij(v) and pij(v) is the price and demand of variety v when it is produced in region i and
consumed in region j. In the latter expression we have normalized w.l.o.g. the marginal
cost of production to zero and assumed a unit transport cost  paid in numéraire. By
(5), the individual demand writes as
qij(v) = (b+ c) [b(v)  pij(v)] + c (Pj   )
for all i; j 2 fH;Fg. Under monopolistic competition, rms are too small to a¤ect the
aggregate variables. So, they set their prices pii(v) and pij(v) taking the price indices
(Pi;Pj) and the distribution of quality (b()) as givens. The optimal prices are computed
as it follows:
pii(v) =
(b+ c) b(v) + c (Pi   )
2(b+ c)
and pij(v) = pjj(v) +

2
(8)
which depend on the quality of the variety o¤ered. At the equilibrium in the product
market, the rms prices (pii(v); pij(v)) are consistent with aggregate prices or price indices
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(Pi;Pj). The latter are successively equal to
Pi =
Z 1
0
pii(v)di(v) +
Z 1
0
pji(v)dj(v)
=
Z 1
0
pii(v)di(v) +
Z 1
0

pii(v) +

2

dj(v)
=
Z 1
0
pii(v)dv +
Z 1
0

2
dj(v)
=
b+ cPi
2(b+ c)
+

2
nj
Solving for the xed point yields
Pi =
b+ (b+ c)nj
2b+ c
(9)
Hence, the price index depends only on the average quality and the number of rms in
each region. It does not depend on the quality chosen by each rm and on the particular
location of rms. This property stems from the fact that preferences are linear in the
quality parameter. Equilibrium prices are then equal to
pii(v) =
1
2
2b+ njc
2b+ c
+
b(v)  
2
and pij(v) = p

jj(v) +

2
(10)
Firms selling higher quality products set higher prices. Indeed, each rms prices increase
with its idiosyncratic product quality. They however fall with larger average product
quality (@pii(v)=@ < 0). The rm reacts to more attractive competing goods by lowering
its prices. Also, note that rms inate the price of their exports pij(v) by half of the
transport cost. This means that their exportsfreigh in board (f.o.b.) prices (pij(v)  )
are equal to pjj(v)   =2, which includes a discount of half of the transport cost. For
a given price index at the destination, larger trade costs result in smaller f.o.b. prices,
which is consistent with empirical evidence (e.g. Baldwin and Harrigan, 2011; Manona
and Zhang, 2012)
We observe that prices are independent to the precise composition of local production.
That is, each rm sets a price pii(v) that depends only on the quality of its own varietyb(v), on the average quality  and on the mass of rms (ni; nj) in each region. In other
words, for any given prole of quality b() that yields the average quality , the prices
pii(v) and p

ij(v) depend only on b(v) and (ni; nj) but not on the sets (Vi;Vj). This
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independence of prices to the precise composition of local production turns out to be a
useful property in the subsequent analysis of spatial selection (see Section 4).
Given the above prices, it is easy to show that rms optimal output is equal to
qii(v) = (b + c)p

ii(v) and q

ij(v) = (b + c)
 
pij(v)  

. So, rms sizes (qii(v) + q

ij(v)),
exports quantities (Ljqij(v)) and export values (Lj
 
pij(v)  

qij(v)) uctuates in the
same direction as export prices and f.o.b. prices. This is also consistent with recent
empirical literature. The prot of rm v located in region i can be written as
i(v) = L(b+ c)
h
i(p

ii(v))
2 + j
 
pij(v)  
2i  I (b (v))  ri(v) (11)
In this analysis we have assumed that bilateral trade. To garantee this, we must impose
that exports are positive, qij(v) > 0; or equivalently, that the f.o.b. prices p

ij(v)   
remain positive in equilibrium. Section 3.4 discusses this condition in more detail.
We now analyze the rmssimultaneous choice of quality and location. For the sake
of exposition we make a separate discussion about the choice of quality in Section 3. The
analysis of the simultaneous choice follows in Section 4.
3 Product quality and trade
In this section we discuss a trade model where the spatial distribution of rms is given and
where rms are able to choose their quality investments. We assume decreasing returns to
investment in quality where each rm can improve its quality to a quality z by investing
an amount
I(z) = I (z   )2 if z  
of numéraire. The investment cost is nil otherwise: I(z) = 0 if z < . In this expression,
the parameter  is the costless product quality. This is the level of quality that rms
can achieve at no cost. Because of decreasing returns in quality, higher product qualities
require more than proportional investment levels. For the sake of convenience we dene
I  L(b+ c)Io=4
where L is the total consumer population and where I measures this return to investment
on a per-consumer basis. This formulation is convenient because rmsinvestment incen-
tives are proportional to the total size of market (i.e. L consumers) and because prot
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levels are proportional to the slope of demand functions (b + c). Finally we assume that
the quality investment can be made only in the location where the production is located.
For instance, quality investments are related to specic management e¤orts to improve
product quality, specic training of local labor force or specic manufacturing immobile
equipments.
Under monopolistic competition, the rm is small in the product market and has no
inuence on other rmsprices and quality levels indices. Hence, the rm maximizes its
prot i(v) with respect to its own quality level b(v) taking Pi and  as givens. We get
the rst order condition
@i(v)
@b(v) = L(b+ c)ipii(v) + j  pij(v)    (b (v)  ) Io=2	 = 0 (12)
while the second order condition is satised if and only if Io > 1. The optimal quality is
nite only if decreasing returns in quality investment are strong enough, which we assume
from now. Indeed, if this condition were not satised, investment cost would rise at a
smaller pace than the revenue increase associated to quality improvement and the optimal
quality would be unbounded.
From expression (12), the optimal increase in quality
b (v)   = 2
Io

ip

ii(v) + j
 
pij(v)  

(13)
is proportional to the average markup on the world population and inversely proportional
to the cost of quality investment Io. The rm balances the marginal cost and the marginal
revenues of its quality investment. Under linear demand functions, both outputs and
marginal revenues are proportional to markups. The impact of access is clearly apparent:
since trade costs reduce markups, marginal revenues and therefore incentives to invest in
quality get smaller as the production site is located further away from consumers.
3.1 Product quality and aggregate prices
It is instructive to study the optimal quality as a function of the other rms prices
and the average quality in the economy. It permits to outline how rms react to their
competitive environment. The relationships between quality and prices might be used as
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a basis for empirical work. Plugging the prices (8) into (12), we compute the following
optimal increase in quality:
i     b (v)   =  (b+ c)  c + c (iPi + jPj)  j(b+ c)(Io   1) (b+ c) ; v 2 Vi (14)
This expression allows us to make the following observations. First, ceteris paribus, rms
invest more in quality for smaller average quality and for less substitutable products
(smaller  and c). Firms get higher returns from improving their own qualities in a world
where the industry produces bad qualities and operate under weak competition. Second,
the optimal quality increases with the global average price, which we dene as iPi+jPj.
High aggregate prices allow each rm to set higher prices and give it more incentives to
invest in product quality.
Finally, the quality gap between regions is given by
H   F =

Io   1 (2H   1) (15)
which is simply proportional to the asymmetry in region sizes. As a result, high quality
products are necessarily produced in the larger region. Furthermore, higher trade costs in-
crease the quality gap. This is because the markups on rmsexports decrease with higher
trade costs and reduce the returns to investment in quality. This e¤ect has a stronger
impact on the rms that have a larger share of export in their production, which are the
rms located in the smaller market. Finally, the above expression shows the complemen-
tary e¤ect of trade costs and returns in quality investments. Stronger decreasing returns
(smaller Io) exacerbate the impact of trade costs on regional asymmetries in product
quality.
Note that the quality gap is independent from the location of rms. We have seen
above that the quality of a rm depends just on the global average prices (iPi + jPj)
but is not directly related to the distribution of rms (ni; nj). So, the relocation of rms
does not alter on the quality gap.
3.2 Product quality and location
We now study the optimal quality and prices as a function of rmsspatial distribution.
In particular, we wish to highlight the impact of the co-agglomeration of rms with
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consumers in the larger market.
We rst compute the average quality  = nHH +nF

F . Using (14) and (10) we get
the following relationship:
    = 2b   (HnF + FnH)
Io (2b+ c)  2b (16)
where the denominator is positive because I0 > 1. We note the following points. First,
the average quality increases with higher costless quality . This is because a larger 
makes it cheaper to achieve any quality level. Second, the average quality decreases with
larger trade cost  . As explained above, higher trade costs reduce markups on exports
and diminish the incentives to invest in quality. Finally, let us dene the co-agglomeration
of rms with consumers as follows:
Denition 1 Firms co-agglomerate with consumers in larger market if the number of
rms producing in this market increases. That is, nH rises while H > 1=2.
Remembering that nF = 1   nH and F = 1   F , one can readily check that the
term (HnF + FnH) decreases in nH for any H > 1=2. Hence, average quality falls
when more rms locate in region H (higher nH). As a result, co-agglomeration of rms
with consumers in the large market is good for average quality. This result depends on
two opposite e¤ects. First, markups are larger when rms locate in the larger market
and therefore spend less on trade costs, which entices them to invest more in quality.
Second, product market competition increases when rms collocate in the larger market,
which decreases markups and incentives to invest in quality. In this model, the rst e¤ect
dominates.
We can perform a similar analysis on the following measure of aggregate cost of living
iPi + jPj =   4[(b+ c)Io   2b] [   (HnF + FnH)]
Io (2b+ c)  b
One can show that it increases with higher costless quality  and that it increases with
higher trade cost  i¤ Io > 2b=(b+ c). In the aggregate, prices rise if quality improvement
starts from a larger costless quality level and if market access gets better. A better
market access fosters quality and increase prices. Also, because (HnF + FnH) decreases
in nH for any H > 1=2, the aggregate cost of living decreases when more rms locate
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in the larger region. Although co-agglomeration of rms with consumers in the larger
market improves average quality, it increases competition so that prices tend to fall. The
competition e¤ect is therefore stronger than the quality improvement e¤ect!
The optimal quality is given by the following formula:
i    =
2b
Io (2b+ c)  2b +
cIo (HnF + FnH)
(Io   1) (Io (2b+ c)  2b)  
j
Io   1 (17)
It can be shown that the optimal quality increases with larger costless quality (di =d), it
falls with co-agglomeration of rms with consumers in the larger region (i increases with
HnF + FnH which decreases in nH) and it increases with larger local market (smaller
j). It reects the trade-o¤ discussed earlier. It can be shown that H increases with
trade cost  whereas F decreases with it.
We summarize our results in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 (i) The larger region produces varieties of higher quality. (ii) The quality
gap increases with larger asymmetries in region sizes and with larger trade costs. (iii) The
aggregate cost of living falls as the larger region hosts more rms. (iv) Co-agglomeration
of rms with consumers in the larger market is bad for individual quality, good for average
quality and bad for aggregate prices (thus good for cost of living).
This proposition brings a contrasting perspective on global quality and rmsspatial
distribution. Indeed, on the one hand, the asymmetry in consumersspatial distribution
is a cause spatial disparities in product quality. On the other hand, disparities in rms
spatial distribution lead to a rise in the average quality. This result is novel in the
literature.
We are now equipped to discuss the relationship between prices and location.
3.3 Prices and location
As mentioned above, because qii = (b + c)p

ii and q

ij = (b + c)
 
pij   

, local sales and
export sales move in the same direction as local prices, export prices and export f.o.b.
prices. Given (10), a rm located in region i and choosing its optimal quality sets the
following domestic and export prices:
pii =
1
2
2b+ njc
2b+ c
+
i   
2
and pij =
1
2
2b+ nic
2b+ c
+
i   
2
+

2
(18)
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The two (rst) terms of each expression reect two location forces underlying the choice
of quality. The rst term represents the optimal price for a hypothetical average quality
good(i = 
). Prices therefore increase with average quality . In Ottaviano and
Thisses (2004) model, a higher (homogenous) quality increases the willingness to pay for
each product and reduces the impact of trade costs on rmscompetition and therefore on
prices. Consequently, trade barriers cannot o¤er as much protection against competitors
and entice rms to agglomerate. Trade costs therefore exert a smaller dispersion force
and agglomeration is more likely to take place. The same process takes place here with
the average quality , which, however, depends on the location of rms and consumers.
Hence, by (16), the co-agglomeration of rms with consumers in the larger market in-
creases average quality and therefore inates prices and outputs upwards. This e¤ect
strengthens when the decreasing returns of investment in product quality Io weaken.
The second term represents a markup for quality (resp. a discount if i < 
) for
the rms quality advantage (resp. disadvantage). In this model without income e¤ects,
quality a¤ects the consumers individual demand in the same way in each region. As a
result, the rm sets the same markup (resp. discount) for quality in both markets. The
markup for quality of rms located in the larger region H can be expressed as
H   
2
=

2 (Io   1) (H   F ) (1  nH) > 0 (19)
which increases with region size asymmetries (larger H) but decreases with the co-
agglomeration of rms in the domestic market (larger nH). Markups for quality create a
repulsion force for rms locating in the larger market because those rms see the individ-
ual benet of their quality advantage reduced as more rms locate there. Firms located
in the smaller region get a quality discount
F   
2
=   
2 (Io   1) (H   F )nH < 0 (20)
whose absolute value increases with stronger region size asymmetries (larger H) and with
further co-agglomeration of rms in the larger market (larger nH). As more rms co-
agglomerate in the larger region H, the average quality rises and aggravates the quality
discount of the rms producing in the smaller market. However, the overall e¤ect is
that the quality markups and discounts exert a dispersion force on rms, which counters
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too much agglomeration of rms in the larger locale. This e¤ect also strengthens when
decreasing returns of quality investments Io weaken, in particular when Io is close to one.
To sum up, the choice of quality creates two conicting forces: an agglomeration force
because average price-trade cost ratio rises and a dispersion forces because the net benet
of quality advantage diminishes as more rms agglomerate in the larger region. Those
forces are exacerbated by smaller decreasing returns of quality investments.
3.3.1 Impact of trade costs
The present analysis also allows us to disentangle the various e¤ects of trade costs on
export prices and quantities.4 Di¤erentiating the above price, we get the following changes
in the markup
d
d
 
pij   

=  1
2|{z}
 
+
1
2
nic
2b+ c| {z }
+
+
b
2b+ c
d
d| {z }
 
+
1
2
d (i   )
d| {z }
+= 
+
2666412 c2b+ c| {z }
+
+
b
2b+ c
d
dni| {z }
+
+
1
2
d (i   )
dni| {z }
 =+
37775 dnid|{z}
 =+
which is also proportional to export and f.o.b. price changes. A fall in trade cost has
various e¤ects on markups and exports. It rstly has the standard e¤ects that we nd
in homogenous quality models. One the one hand, it raises the markups and exports
because of the presence of an imperfect pass-through (rst term  1=2).5 Firms indeed
pass through a half of trade costs to their foreign consumers and subsidize the other half.
Lower trade costs reduce such subsidy incentives and raise markups and export output.
On the other hand, the fall in trade costs pushes consumer prices down in the foreign
market and intensies the price competition there, which pushes markups and exports
down (second term). It can readily been shown that the former e¤ect dominates the
latter.
4Since changes in trade costs are equivalent to bilateral changes in tari¤s and changes in distances
between trade partners, the following analysis applies for the study of pass-through e¤ects of tari¤s and
transport costs.
5For instance, the existence of an imperfect pass-through is reported in De Loecker et al. (2012).
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A fall in trade cost also has an e¤ect through the direct changes in product quality.
It rstly improves market access so that rms invest more in product quality so that the
average product quality rises and rms set higher export prices (third negative term).
This is the main e¤ect of endogenous quality when regions have similar sizes (H ' F ).
However when countries have di¤erent sizes, a fall in trade cost a¤ects each countrys ex-
ports in a di¤erent way (fourth term). Because it reduces the market access disadvantage
of the smaller region (i = F ), the rms producing there have additional incentives to raise
their quality level, markup and export price and output. By contrast, the rms in the
larger region (i = H) benet from a lower market access advantage and cannot raise their
quality, export price and output as much. So, a fall in trade cost improves the smaller
regions position on the quality ladder more than the larger one.
Finally, a fall in trade costs has an impact through the relocation of rms (see the
three terms in squared bracket). Suppose that the fall in trade costs leads to the co-
agglomeration of rms with consumers in the larger market. Accordingly, the number of
rms increases in the larger region and decreases in the other (dnH=d < 0 < dnF=d).
This will be shown to be the case in the footloose capital equilibrium discussed in Section
4. Consider the rms producing in the larger region (i = H). First, their export market
is served by fewer local rms so that the weaker competition entices all rms to set higher
prices there (rst positive term). Second, the coagglomeration of rms with consumers in
the larger market improves the average product quality and increases export prices and
output (second positive term). Those two e¤ects on product quality therefore entice rms
to raise their export prices and output when trade costs fall. As above, this is the main
e¤ect of rms relocation when regions have similar sizes (H ' F ). By contrast, when
countries have di¤erent sizes, the larger country o¤ers a market access advantage. This
advantage however diminishes because local entry of rms induces stronger competition,
which restrains or reverts the rise of export prices and output from the larger region. The
overall e¤ect depends on the economic parameters.6 So, the choice of product quality and
the co-agglomeration of rms in the larger market attenuate and may reverse the negative
6For instance, the overall e¤ect is positive for the parameters  = 1;  = 1;  = :9; Io = 5; H = 0:55
and the endogenous value nH = 0:718 satisfying (21) and (22).
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impact of trade costs on f.o.b. prices and exports from the higher quality region.7
We now turn to the discussion of the existence of bilateral trade.
3.4 Bilateral trade
Bilateral trade takes place when rms export from all regions. It may not be feasible for
all values of economic parameters.8 In particular, rms located in the smaller region have
lower quality and sell at a competitive disadvantage. Those rms are the rst that stop
exporting. The export quantities qFH are proportional to the markups p

FH   t. Using
(16) and (17), it can be shown that those quantities fall with the number of rms in the
larger market nH as competition intensies there.9 So, bilateral trade occurs if and only
if qFH > 0, or equivalently, if nH remains lower than the threshold
nH (Io)  2b

   + 2b
Io(2b+c) 2b (  H)
c+ (H   F )

2b+c
Io 1   4b
2
Io(2b+c) 2b
 (21)
where the second term in the denominator is positive because Io > 1. It is apparent that
the threshold nH (Io) falls with H and  . Therefore, bilateral trade is more likely to be
supported for smaller region size asymmetries and trade costs. The role of investments in
product quality is however ambiguous.
Consider rstly the case where decreasing returns to quality investments are small
enough (e.g. Io ! 1). Then we get nH (1) = 0 and we can conclude that bilateral trade
is never feasible. In this case, rms have more incentives to invest in quality in the larger
region because they benet from a better access to the larger market and because the
cost of quality investment does not increase that much as quality rises. Regional quality
and markups diverge dramatically and create large price discrepancies and large export
di¤erences. As a consequence, exports from the smaller region fall to zero for any trade
cost and any regional size asymmetries.
7This argument about endogenous quality may be consistent with Baldwin and Harrigans (2011)
empirical evidence according which average U.S. export prices fall with proximity.
8Behrens (2005) and Okubo et al (2010) provide a study of bilateral and unilateral trade ows in a
homogenous quality model.
9Indeed, dq

FH
dnH
=   12 c2b+c [1 + Io(4b+c) 2b(Io 1)(Io(2b+c) 2b) (H   F )] < 0
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Consider secondly the case where decreasing returns to quality investment are very
large (e.g. Io !1). In this case, rms choose a quality level close to the costless quality 
and the markups for quality (i   ) =2 tend to zero. We therefore return to a model with
a homogenous quality  where, as explained in the previous sub-section, a higher quality
increases the willingness to pay for each product and reduces the impact of trade costs on
rmscompetition and therefore on prices. Firmslocation will then have a smaller impact
on the existence of exports from region F if trade barriers are low. Using the previous
formula, we get that bilateral trade is feasible i¤ nH < nH (1)  2b (  ) = (c). One
can check that bilateral trade is always feasible if  < 1  2b= (2b+ c) because nH (1)
lies above one, while it is never feasible if  >  because nH (1) is smaller than zero. For
trade costs between 1 and , bilateral trade is feasible only if the larger region does not
host too many manufacturing competitors.
For intermediate values of returns Io, the impact of rmslocation on exports from
region F depends on how average quality and quality di¤erences move. One can check
that the function nH (Io) is a bell-shaped function of Io over the interval [0; 1] if H < H
and  < 10 where
H  1
2
+
b (2  )
2 (4b+ c)  2 (3b+ c) < 1
Otherwise, nH (Io) is an increasing function of Io over this interval. As a result, on the
one hand, when returns to quality investment are strong (small Io) or region sizes di¤er
a lot (high H), nH (Io) is an increasing function. A rise in the number of rms in market
H mainly accentuates product quality di¤erences between regions, intensies competition
and impedes rms to export to this market. Weaker returns to quality investment (larger
Io) then diminish quality di¤erences and competition so that they entice foreigners to
export in this market. On the other hand, when returns to quality investment are weak
(high Io) and region sizes do not di¤er too much (low H), nH (Io) becomes a decreasing
function. In this case, regional product quality di¤erences do not constitute a dominant
channel. Rather, weaker returns to quality investment (larger Io) diminish the average
quality, consumerswillingness to pay and product prices. As trade costs become a larger
component of product prices, exporting becomes more di¢ cult, in particular from the
10If  < , this function has an increasing and a decreasing section on the interval [0; 1]. If  > , the
decreasing section lies above the interval [0; 1].
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smaller market F .
We summarize this discussion in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Bilateral trade is more likely to be supported for smaller trade costs
and/or lower dispersion of consumers and/or smaller number of rms in the larger mar-
ket. Bilateral trade is more likely to be supported for weaker returns to quality investments
if and only if those returns are weak or region sizes are su¢ ciently di¤erent.
3.5 Optimality of investments in product quality
We here nally study whether the equilibrium implies too large or too low quality lev-
els. The issue of e¢ cient product quality is discussed by Spence (1975) for the case of
monopoly. In this seminal paper, the e¢ ciency of equilibrium quality depends on how the
rm internalizes the benet of a quality increase on inframarginal consumers. This sub-
section extends this seminal analysis to the case of monopolistic competition and trade.
It emphasizes the role of the externality of each rms quality choice on consumers and
on other rms. For simplicity, we assume that bilateral trade is possible at the costless
quality  so that  < .
Note rst that rms individually choose a higher quality than the quality that max-
imizes industry prots tot  Pi RVi i(v)dv. Over-investment in quality takes place
because rms do not internalize the negative e¤ect of their quality increases on their com-
petitorssales. Indeed, an increase in average quality reduces the prot of any rm that
does not simultaneously raise its quality level. This easiest way to show this is to study
the simultaneous rise of each quality b(v) to b(v) + " where " is a su¢ ciently small
positive real number. Then, we get
dtot
d"
=  Lc (b+ c)
2b+ c
Io
2
(   ) < 0
(see Appendix). So, rms would prefer lower quality and there exists over-investment in
quality from the producersperspective. Such over-investments in quality increase with
stronger product substitutability. Indeed, the above expression is nil when products are
independent (c = 0) and rises with stronger product substitution (larger c). As each rm
tries to raise its product quality to steal the business of other rms, rms end up reaching
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quality levels that they would not implement if they were alone in the market. There is
an undesired curse for quality from the perspective of producers. Investors and industry
lobbies should call for lower quality levels.
The role of trade and consumer location can be analyzed as follows. Because lower
trade costs increase the average quality , they increase the extent of over-investment in
quality. This is because rms lose the market protection of trade barriers and endure a
tougher competition and curse for quality. Similarly, because co-agglomeration of rms
with consumers in the larger market raises the average quality, it exacerbates the e¤ect
of over-investment in quality. A growing number of rms in the larger market obviously
intensies competition and the curse for quality there.
Although the equilibrium level of quality is too high from the perspective of rms, it
still remains lower than what consumers prefer. Firms are indeed not able to collect the
whole consumer surplus from an increase of their quality so that they do not internalize
the whole benet of a better quality to infra-marginal consumers. More formally, using
condition (3) one can write the consumer surplus of an individual located in region i as
Ui =
1
2
Z
V
[b(v)  p(v)] q(v)dv + qoi
If we raise again each quality b(v) to b(v) + ", we get (see Appendix)
dUi
d"
=
b(b+ c)2
(2b+ c)2
(   nj)
which is positive because    >  . Hence, consumers would prefer higher quality goods
even though those goods would be priced higher. There is under-investment in product
quality from the consumersperspective. This is true for consumers residing in all regions.
Yet, those residing in the region hosting the largest number of rms benet from a better
access to products and would gain more from an increase in product quality (dUi=d" >
dUj=d" () ni > nj). Finally, the impact of trade and consumer location is naturally
the opposite of the one on rms: from the perspective of the average consumer, under-
investment in product quality is aggravated by lower trade costs and co-agglomeration of
rms with consumers in the larger market. Indeed, some lines of algebra readly show that
the aggregate utility LiUi + LjUj is a decreasing function of  (HnF + FnH) where
(HnF + FnH) falls with co-agglomeration of rms with consumers in the larger market.
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Since a global quality increase a¤ects industries and consumers in opposite ways, it is
natural to ask whether such an increase would raise aggregate welfare. In the Appendix,
we compute that, at the equilibrium average quality  given by (16),
d
d"
 
LiUi + LjUj + 
tot

= 2b2Io (2b+ c)
   (HnF + FnH)
Io (2b+ c)  2b
which is positive because HnF + FnH < 1 and    . So, global welfare would
be increased by a global increase of quality. There is thus under-investment in qual-
ity from a welfare viewpoint. Because the latter expression is a decreasing function of
 (HnF + FnH), we can make the same conclusion as for consumers: from a welfare
perspective, under-investment in product quality is aggravated by lower trade costs and
co-agglomeration of rms with consumers.
We summarize this discussion in the following proposition:
Proposition 4 The equilibrium average quality is set too high for producers and too low
for both consumersand welfares viewpoint . Those e¤ects are exacerbated by lower trade
costs and by the co-agglomeration of rms with consumers in the larger market.
We now turn to the discussion of the rmslocation choice.
4 Product quality and economic geography
In this section we study how rmschoices of location and quality shape the economic
geography. It is well-know that rm or capital mobility fosters spatial polarization of
economic activity. It is however less clear how di¤erences in region sizes a¤ect the quality
produced in each region and the number of rms locating in each region. We here show
that, compared to the case with exogenous quality levels, the home market e¤ect can be
stronger ore weaker under endogenous quality.
We present a footloose capital model in which unit mass of capital is inelasticly sup-
plied by a set of immobile capital owners. Because of the immobility of the capital owners
and because of the absence of income e¤ect in the demand for manufacturing goods, the
residence place of those agents has no importance on product demands, prots and loca-
tion of rms. For the sake of exposition, we assume that the capital market is perfectly
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competitive and that each rm requires one unit of capital in order to operate. As a
result, the mass of varieties is equal to unity and the previous analysis holds.
The equilibrium in the capital market is obtained as follows. Capital owners allocate
their capital to the rms that o¤er the highest return across regions. To obtain a unit
of capital, each rm chooses the location that maximizes its prot and bids for capital
up to the value that cancels its prot. As a result, we get two possible congurations.
On the one hand, the whole capital ows in region H (resp. F ) so that nH = 1 (resp.
nF = 1) because rms producing in this region always o¤ers a better return: rH > rF
(resp rF > rH). On the other hand, the capital spreads across regions so that nH 2 [0; 1]
because rms o¤er the same return in both regions: rH = rF . Therefore, the location of
rms is given by the rent di¤erential r (nH) = rH   rF .
For the sake of simplicity, we focus on the case of bilateral trade. We study the
equilibrium where rms simultaneously choose their location and quality investment. This
means that rms see the two decisions with the same degree of irreversibility.11 From the
previous section we know that quality investments depend on rmslocations. The rent
di¤erential writes as
r (nH) = L

H

(pHH)
2   (pFH   )2
  F (pFF )2   (pHF   )2	
  1
Io

[Hp

HH + F (p

HF   )]2   [FpFF + H (pFH   )]2
	
where optimal prices are functions of the individual and average quality (i ,
) that
depend on the location of rms. Bilateral trade imposes that the spatial equilibrium nH
satises condition (21).
After some simplications, we get that the rent di¤erential r (nH) is proportional
to the function (H ; Io)  (nH   1=2) where
(H ; Io) =
2b (2  )
c
(H   1=2) G (H   1=2; Io) (22)
11Note rst that the present model also applies to the sequential model where rms choose their
locations before their quality investments. Second, Picard and Okubo (2012) study a same model quality
is exogenous. Extending the latter analysis to a sequential model with a quality decision before the
location choice adds up a coordination problem between quality and location decision time periods.
Finally, the present model can be loosely interpreted as a dynamic model where, in each period, some
rms die because their varieties become obsolete and are replaced by new rms that choose their location
and quality.
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and
G (x; Io) =
(2b+ c) Io (Io   1)
(Io   1) ((2b+ c) Io   2b) + ((4b+ c) Io   2b) 4x2
The numerator and denominator of the function G are positive because Io > 1. Because
r decreases in nH , the location equilibrium exists and is unique. Therefore the location
equilibrium is given by
nH = min[
1
2
+ (H ; Io); 1]
We rst highlight the e¤ects of trade costs. It is trivial to check that (H) decreases
with larger : Furthermore, using (16) and (15), it can readily be shown that
d (H   H)
d
=
2H   1
Io   1 > 0 and
d
d
/   (HnF + FnH) + 
2
(2H   1) dn

H
d
< 0
Therefore, whereas the quality gap falls when trade cost falls, average quality rises. The
directions of those e¤ects are the same as in the model with exogenous rm locations that
we discussed in the previous section.
The following proposition summarizes those results.
Proposition 5 Under bilateral trade, the location equilibrium exists and is unique. In
this equilibrium, high quality varieties are produced in the larger region. As trade costs
fall, more rms locate in the larger region, the average quality rises and the quality gap
between regions decreases.
We can now discuss how the spatial distribution of rms changes as region size asym-
metries rise. In particular we study the home market e¤ect (HME) according to which
the market equilibrium may involve a more than proportionate share of industry in the
region with the larger population. That is, we measure the home market e¤ect as
HME  n

H   1=2
H   1=2 > 1
In our model with endogenous regional product qualities (H ; 

F ), we get
HME(H ; 

F ) =
2b (2  )
c
G (H   1=2; Io) (23)
The function G(x; Io) decreases in x for all x 2 [0; 1=2]: it is larger than one if and only if
x < bx pb(Io   1)=[2(4b+ c)Io   4b]. Hence the home market e¤ect falls with stronger
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region size asymmetries. It is interesting to compare this home market e¤ect with the
case of homogenous product quality. We focus on two cases where the product quality is
set to either the costless quality  or the average quality .
Firms implement the costless quality for too prohibitive quality investments. Since
limIo!1G(x;1) = 1, we can use (23) to obtain
HME(; ) =
2b (2  )
c
which is smaller than HME(H ; 

F ) if H smaller than 1=2 + bx. In this situation, the
home market e¤ect is independent of region sizes and lower than in the case of endogenous
product quality provided that regions are not too dissimilar. Indeed, under endogenous
product quality, product quality and consumerswillingness to pay increase as the larger
region hosts more consumers. As a result, rms set higher prices and trade costs o¤er a
smaller protection against competition. This weakens the dispersion forces and strength-
ens the home market e¤ect. This mechanism reects the impact of quality investments
on average quality.
Applying the last formula to the case where the homogenous quality is equal to  we
get
HME(; ) =
2b (2   )
c
In the absence of region size asymmetries (H = 1=2), product quality, we have that
H = 

F = 
 so that HME(; ) = HME(H ; 

F ). Therefore since HME(

H ; 

F )
falls with stronger size asymmetry (higher H), we have HME(H ; 

F ) < HME(
; )
if H > 1=2. As a consequence, the home market e¤ect is smaller when rms set their
own product quality than when they are forced to produce at the average quality. This
is because the co-agglomeration of rms with consumers in the larger market is bad
for the product quality of each individual rm producing in that market. This reduces
prots there and refrains the incentives to locate in the larger market. This mechanism
reects the pro-competitive e¤ects of product quality di¤erences that quality investments
generate.
This yields the following proposition.
Proposition 6 Under bilateral trade, the home market e¤ect decreases with stronger re-
gion size asymmetries. It is weaker than the home market e¤ect existing under a homoge-
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nous average qualitywhile it is stronger than the home market e¤ect prevailing under a
homogenous costless qualityif regions are not too dissimilar.
We nally study the impact of a fall in the decreasing returns of quality investment
Io on the location of rms. One can show that G(x; 1) = 0 and G(x;1) = 1 and that
G(x; Io) increases in Io for any
Io < Io(x) 
8<: 1 +
2x2(2b+c)+
p
2b(2b+c)(1 4x2)x2
b (8b+2c)x2 if x
2 < b=[2(4b+ c)]
1 if x2  b=[2(4b+ c)]
A fall in the decreasing returns of quality investment Io has a non monotone e¤ect on
rms location asymmetries nH and home market e¤ect if region size asymmetries are small
enough ((H   1=2)2 < b=[2(4b + c)]). As Io falls to one, location asymmetries nH and
home market e¤ect rst increase and then decrease. Otherwise, if region size asymmetries
are large enough, location asymmetries and home market e¤ect always diminish as Io falls.
This result must be related to Proposition 3 and stems from the agglomeration and
dispersion forces of the choice of quality on rmslocation. For large Io; the agglomeration
e¤ect dominates as a fall in Io increases average qualitymore than it decreases the quality
markups. For small enough Io, the dispersion e¤ect dominates as a fall in Io a¤ects more
negatively the quality markups than it a¤ects average quality. Hence, rms tend to
agglomerate more for large Io and disperse more for smaller Io. To sum up, weaker
decreasing returns to quality investment monotonically increase the number of rms in
the larger region only if region size asymmetries are strong enough. Otherwise, they can
have non-monotone e¤ects. This is summarized in our last proposition.
Proposition 7 Under bilateral trade, changes in the technology of investment in product
quality may raise or diminish countriesinequalities.
5 Conclusion
The present paper studies the e¤ect of the choice of product quality on trade and location
of rms. In this model consumers have preferences for the quality of a set of manufacturing
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varieties. Firms do not only develop and sell manufacturing varieties in a monopolistic
competitive market but also determine the quality level of their varieties by investing in
research and development. We show that the larger region produces varieties of higher
quality and that the quality gap increases with larger asymmetries in region sizes and
with larger trade costs. In a footloose capital model we nd that the home market e¤ect
is qualied.
This paper sets the stage for further investigations. A traditional research direction
is the study of workersmobility in a core-periphery model. As discussed in our analysis,
we expect that the investments in product quality exacerbate the agglomeration forces
and give more prevailance to the central places. This might t the di¤erence in product
quality between rural and urban areas and between large and small cities. It would inter-
esting to highlight the e¤ect of investments on the average quality and quality markups
and therefore to outline the pro-competitive e¤ects resulting from quality choices. A more
challenging study would be to extend the model to income heterogeneity, as the patterns
of trade depend on product quality and therefore on the subtle interplay of the income
distribution and non-homothetic preferences. Also, because they depend on exogenous
regional di¤erences and quality markups, income distribution might reinforce the ten-
dency of rms producing high quality to agglomerate in the high income region. Such a
study should discuss a model with non-homothetic preferences and income e¤ects on the
consumption of the di¤erentiated varieties.
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Appendix
Let us raise each quality b(v) to b(v) + " where " is a su¢ ciently small positive real
number. We then get
dtot
d"
=
X
i
Z
Vi

@i (v)
@b(v) + @i (v)@

dv
=  Lc (b+ c)
2b+ c
X
i
Z
Vi

ip

ii(v) + j
 
pij(v)  

dv
=  Lc (b+ c)
2b+ c
Io
2
(   ) < 0
where we apply the envelop theorem in the rst line (@i (v)=@b(v) = 0 by (12)), we
use @pij(v)=@ =  c= (2b+ c) < 0 in the second line and we use (13) and integrate over
varieties in the third line.
The consumer surplus is given by
Ui =
1
2
Z
V
[b(v)  p(v)] q(v)dv + qoi
which can be broken down by country as
Ui =
(b+ c)
2
Z
Vi
[b(v)  pii(v)] pii(v)dv+(b+ c)2
Z
Vj
b(v)  pji(v) pji(v)  =2 dv+qoi
If we raise again each quality b(v) to b(v) + ", we successively get
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where we use dpji(v)=d" = b= (2b+ c) <
1
2
. Furthermore, we can rstly integrate b(v)
over the sets Vi and Vj, secondly substitutes for the values of prices and then simplify to
get:
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which is positive because    >  .
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Using (16) we have
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